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ABSTRACT
Previous  failures  in effective, large-scale 
disaster response (e.g.,  Hurricane Katrina) 
are  often traced to  failures  in effective 
coordination.  As  evidenced in after-action 
r e p o r t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a s s e s s m e n t s o f 
coordination performance are still largely 
anecdotal in nature. Network analysis  is a 
possible means  to  develop quantitative 
metrics  for coordination assessment.  In this 
paper, two  techniques  are proposed for 
characterizing coordination performance. 
First, Borgatti’s  technique for quantifying 
network  fragmentation was used to measure 
the extent to which various response 
agencies  play a role  in establishing efficient 
communications. Second, Girvan and 
Newman’s technique for community sub-
group identification was  used to identify 
potential breakdowns in information 
transfer. Both techniques were successfully 
implemented in a case-study analysis  of the 
Top Officials  4  exercise. The techniques  can 
provide additional insights  into  coordination 
p e r f o r m a n c e , i d e n t i f y i n g e x e r c i s e 
artificialities  and allowing meta-analysis  of 
coordination performance (e.g.,  over time, 
across regions, for different event scales).
INTRODUCTION
Coordination,  or  lack thereof,  has been 
identified as a  key  bottleneck in  effective 
management  of disasters such  as Hurricane 
Katrina.1  Large-scale events frequently 
demand more complex  forms of organization, 
larger  quantities of resources,  and access to 
specialized equipment and personnel under 
condit ions of decreased s i tuat ional 
awareness.2  As a  result,  the challenge of 
establishing  effective coordination  may 
increase nonlinearly  with  respect  to increases 
in  various event  scales (e.g.,  size, severity). 
Unfortunately, quantitative metrics for 
measuring  coordination  performance do not 
yet  exist. Assessments of coordination 
performance – such  as those found in  after-
action  reports – are still predominantly 
anecdotal. Development of quantitative 
metrics to characterize coordination  would 
allow  for a  more robust  method of measuring 
response coordination  progress and facilitate 
our  understanding  of how  coordination  is 
negatively affected by event scales.
Social network  analysis is a  possible 
means to obtain meaningful,  quantitative 
metrics. Recent  years have seen  an  increase 
in  the application  of social network analysis 
concepts to homeland security.  For  example, 
Naim  Kapucu cast  the evolution  of national 
response frameworks as a series of network 
graphs.3 Moreover,  researchers have studied 
coordination  and emergent  player  roles for 
events such as Hurricane Katrina  and 9/11.4 
Meanwhile,  social  network  analysis has also 
seen the development of a  variety  of new 
quantitative  methods to characterize 
networks.
To this end, two possible techniques are 
proposed to generate quantitative measures 
of coordination: (1) a  centrality  measure 
introduced by  Stephen Borgatti to address 
what  he called the negative variation of the 
Key  Player  Problem  (KPP-Negative);5 and (2) 
a  technique for  detecting community 
structure developed in  a  series of papers by 
Girvan  and Newman. 6 Borgatti’s technique is 
used to identify  key  coordinating  agencies 
and could potentially  be used to chart the 
development of emergency  operations 
centers (EOCs),  as well  as provide an 
outcome value for  statistical analysis. 7 
M e a n w h i l e ,  c o m m u n i t y  s u b - g r o u p 
examination  via  Girvan  and Newman’s 
technique could be used to identify  potential 
information stove-piping. The underlying 
basis and reasons for selecting  these 
techniques are discussed in the Data  and 
Approach section.
These approaches were applied in  an 
analysis of evaluator  logs from  the Portland, 
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Oregon  site of the 2007  Top Officials 4 
(TOPOFF 4) exercise. TOPOFF 4  provides a 
rare opportunity  to examine coordination  in 
the context  of a large-scale, catastrophic 
event. Thus far,  evaluator  records from 
TOPOFF 4  have been used to support 
construction  of various after-action  reports.8 
However,  the notion  was to explore whether 
additional insights on coordination  could be 
obtained – given the extensive database of 
communication-related information  collected 
– using the frequency  of communication  as a 
proxy  for  coordination  effectiveness. While 
highlighting  the potential  of social  network 
analysis,  this article also points out  the need 
for  additional research  and validation. Thus, 
it  includes recommendations for  improving 
data collection in future exercises.   
DATA AND APPROACH
TOPOFF 4 DATASET
TOPOFF 4  is one of what are now  designated 
Tier  I National  Level Exercises (NLE). Given 
the infrequent  occurrence of catastrophes, 
few  events involve the full  spectrum  of the 
response community  (spanning vertically 
across all  levels of government  and 
geographically  across regions, and involving 
both  non-governmental organizations and 
the private sector).  Tier  I NLE provide a rare 
glimpse of how  coordination  fairs in  a 
catastrophic  context,  including  participation 
at  local,  county, state, and federal levels, as 
well  as private sector  and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO).  Since the original 
TOPOFF in  2000,  a  primary  goal  has been  “…
to improve the capability  of government 
officials and agencies,  both  within the United 
States and abroad to provide an  effective, 
coordinated,  and strategic  response to a 
terrorist  attack.” 9 TOPOFF 4  took  place from 
October 15–19,  2007, involving  more than 
15,000 federal,  state,  local, and private sector 
participants. The scenario for  TOPOFF 4 
involved detonations of multiple radiological 
dispersal  devices, with  a coordinated series of 
attacks taking place in: Guam; Portland, 
Oregon; and Phoenix, Arizona. 
The specific data  source used for  this 
analysis was the TOPOFF 4  Full  Scale 
Exercise  Reconstruction  Database,  which  is a 
Microsoft Access database primarily 
composed of evaluator  “log-book”  style 
entries recorded during  the course of the 
exercise. In  total,  this database contains 
14,100 records. To simplify  content  analysis, 
only  records specific to the Portland,  Oregon 
location  were analyzed.  Since evaluators were 
not collecting information  for  the specific 
purpose of constructing  a  communication 
network, limitations to this dataset exist, 
which include but are not limited to: 
• Entries contingent on what  evaluators 
considered to be important;
• Entry  def in i t ion  i ssues : namely , 
evaluators may  have delineated entries 
b a s e d o n  c o n t e n t i n s t e a d o f 
communication  instance (i.e., multiple, 
separate entries may  have been  taken 
from a single conversation); 
• Accounting for  passive means of 
communication  (e.g. website posting, 
WebEOC, emails); 
• Collection  bias due to the availability  and 
placement of evaluators; 
• Evaluator  versus player  awareness (i.e., 
information  recorded by  the evaluator is 
not necessarily  information that  has been 
effectively  conveyed to all players at the 
location); 
• Inconsistent use of terminology;
• Referencing by name instead of position; 
• Failure to identify  injects and simulated 
players; and
• Failure to identify  all  participants 
involved in  conferences/meetings/ 
teleconferences. 
Even  so,  the database contains some of the 
highest  quality  data  to date on exercise 
communication  recorded as it  was taking 
place. As such,  it  is not subject  to some of the 
shortcomings associated with  post-event 
attempts at  reconstructing  communication 
networks (e.g., recollection bias).
CODING THE DATA
Among the fields recorded by  evaluators were 
time, description, and location. Descriptions 
were reviewed three times to identify 
communications taking  place between 
players.  The first  review  was broken  down  by 
site (the Portland,  OR location  included 
multiple sites of exercise  play).  The second 
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review  was performed with  all entries listed 
in  chronological order; this was done to 
enforce consistency  in  coding  and remove 
duplicate entries recorded by  multiple 
evaluators.10  The third and final review  was 
done for  those players with  small numbers of 
communication  counts. In  this case,  targeted 
keyword queries of the Access database were 
used to ensure counts were as accurate as 
possible.
A  positive communication  count  was 
tallied for  each instance in  which  “from”  and 
“to”  parties could be identified.  In some 
cases, multiple instances of communication 
were detailed in  the same description; these 
were split  into separate entries.  Directed (or 
one-way) communications were noted when 
possible; however,  the vast  majority  of 
communications were undirected in  nature. 
Failures to communicate (e.g., unanswered 
phone calls) were also noted; each  was coded 
as a negative  count  of communication  (i.e., 
equal to “-1”). 
Identification  of unique players was done 
iteratively,  beginning  with  a  set  of agencies 
identified in the TOPOFF 4  after-action 
reports. In  some cases, larger  agencies such 
as the Department of Energy  fielded multiple 
teams. These were sometimes treated as 
independent  nodes given  a  review  of their 
location  and communication entries. With 
respect to EOCs,  communications received by 
liaisons were assumed to come from  their 
p a r e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I n  a l l c a s e s , 
i n f o r m a t i o n  w a s a s s u m e d t o b e 
communicated by  the liaison to the 
emergency  operation center  leadership (but 
not necessarily  to other  liaisons or  players 
located at  the EOC unless indicated). 
Command staff (e.g.,  Director)  were treated 
as one node,  representing  the overall 
emergency operation center.
Ideal ly , coding would have been 
performed shortly  after  the exercise to allow 
for  follow-up with  evaluators in cases where 
descriptions lacked context/details (e.g.,  a 
communication  partner  was not identified). 
Lacking this informat ion, avai lable 
documents and after  action  reports were 
reviewed to assist  in: (1) deciphering  varying 
nomenclature; (2) identifying actual versus 
simulated players; and (3) determining 
periods of participation.11
ANALYSIS METRICS
As noted by  Weigand and others, “the 
rationale behind coordination  is the existence 
of dependencies between  the activities of 
entities,  and…the goal of coordination  is to 
manage these dependencies in  such a  way 
that  the activities become parts of a 
purposeful whole.” 12 One critical  assumption 
made in  this paper  is that communication  is 
an  adequate proxy  for  coordination  efficacy  – 
namely, more communication  equates to 
more effective coordination. In doing  so,  the 
resulting  analysis metrics are geared towards 
capturing  those aspects of coordination  that 
are influenced by  reducing  the “...information 
asymmetry  that usually  exists between 
actors.”13  Intrinsic to this is the argument 
that  actors seek to reach  a  “shared 
understanding,”  which  then  allows them  to 
c o o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  a c t i o n s . W h i l e 
communication  is not  the only  mechanism  by 
which  to achieve this shared understanding 
(e.g., precedents,  standard operating 
procedures), it  is certainly  a  foundational 
building  block. In  their  review  of Hurricane 
Katrina,  the Select  Bipartisan  Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation  for  and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina noted that  many  of the 
problems they  ident i f ied “could be 
categorized as ‘information gaps’ – or  at  least 
p r o b l e m s w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n - r e l a t e d 
implications, or failures to act  decisively 
because information  was sketchy  at best.”14 
Hence, it  should not  come as a  surprise  that 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c a n  b e l i n k e d t o 
coordination.
Prior  to conducting  any  social network 
analysis,  the definition  of what  constitutes an 
edge and what  edge values mean (in  weighted 
networks)  must  be decided upon.  Raw 
communication counts were not  used to 
describe the edge strength  between  nodes. 
TOPOFF 4  took  place over  a  number  of days. 
Not  all  players participated for  the full 
duration  of the exercise.  To prevent positively 
biasing edge connectivity  for those players 
participating  for  the entire exercises,  the 
period of participation  for  each  player  was 
estimated either  by  registering  their  first  and 
last entries for  each  day  or, for  those players 
infrequently  mentioned, by  referencing  the 
participation  time frame of the primary 
agency  they  associated with  (for  each  day) 
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during  the exercise.  Overlapping time 
intervals of participation  were determined for 
all  pair-wise combinations of players. These 
overlapping  time intervals normalized 
communication  counts to convert  raw 
communication  counts into frequencies of 
communication. These values were then  used 
as the basis for  network construction. Social 
network analysis was predominantly 
conducted using  iGraph  library  subroutines 
in  R. Specifics as to the two social network 
analysis techniques used are discussed below.
KPP-NEGATIVE FOR VALUED EDGES
Centrality  metrics measure the importance of 
a  particular node or  edge within  the overall 
network. One class of centrality  measures is 
based on  the concept  of betweenness. For 
each  pair  of nodes in  a  network,  the geodesic 
(or  shortest  path between the two nodes)  is 
determined. The fraction  of all  shortest  paths 
that  pass through  a  given node determine its 
betweenness value. Higher  betweenness 
scores indicate greater  control over 
communication, since more communication 
optimally passes through this node.15  
There are ,  however ,  a couple o f 
shortcomings in  the use of traditional 
betweenness to evaluate the importance of a 
network node in  facilitating  coordination. 
Basic betweenness centrality  does not 
account for  the ability  of a  system  to 
compensate for  the absence of a node 
t h ro u g h  a l t e rn a t i ve c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
pathways.  In this sense, it  does not provide a 
stiff enough  penalty  to fragmentation of a 
network resulting from  the absence of a  node. 
One example is shown in  Figure 1. Here, the 
function of Node 8 as a  key  communication 
bridge in  this network  is obvious: loss of this 
node results in  fragmentation  of the network 
into two isolated components. However,  as 
calculated, Node 1  is shown  to have the larger 
betweenness score,  although its loss simply 
shifts communication  to alternative (albeit 
longer) communication pathways.
Figure 1. Betweenness scores for two nodes in a 
hypothetical network. As shown, while loss of  Node 8 
will result in fragmentation of  the network into two 
components, the betweenness score for Node 1 is 
higher.  Figure recreated based on an example provided 
by Borgatti.16
The second issue with  some centrality 
m e a s u r e s i s t h a t t h e y  a c c o u n t  f o r 
fragmentation  only; there  is no measure of 
the quality  of communication taking  place 
within  components. This is a  problem  with 
measures that  identify  whether  a  path exists 
between  two nodes,  but  fail to consider the 
corresponding  path length  (which can  be 
quite  large). 17 For  example, both networks in 
Figure 2  have two components.  However,  the 
path  length  of communication between Node 
1  and Node 5  within  each  network is very 
different. In  other  words,  the shape of each  of 
the components must be considered.
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Figure 2. Example of  two network exhibiting the same 
number of  components (two), but vastly  different 
connectedness within each fragment. Figure recreated 
based on an example provided by Borgatti. 18
Borgatti’s technique addresses both  of the 
aforementioned issues.  To determine the 
relative importance of each  node within  a 
network, that node is first  removed from  the 
network, and the corresponding change in 
the fragmentation, F,  is determined. F is 




dij = minimum  path  length  between 
nodes i and j
n = number of nodes
The use of the minimum  path  length 
concept  allows for  consideration  of shape 
effects, whereas the inverse functional  form 
for  path  length  ensures that  the function  is 
well behaved for  node pairs located in 
different fragments. 
Borgatti developed the F-value to range 
from  0  to 1,  with  higher  values corresponding 
to greater  network fragmentation. Implicit in 
the functional form  of Equation  1  is that it  is 
applicable to non-weighted networks (i.e.,  all 
edges have values of 1). 19  To expand 
Borgatti’s technique to weighted edges, a 
normalization  constant is utilized to 
r e p r e s e n t  t h e “ i d e a l ”  f r e q u e n c y  o f 
communication  (and,  in  turn,  the minimal 
path  length  value). Hence,  the proposed 
modified equation (Equation 2) is:
 
 (2)
where the only  difference is the inclusion  of 
the normalization term Dmin.
Since shorter path  lengths result  from 
higher  levels of frequency, note that the 
contribution to the path  length  of each 
individual edge is the inverse of the frequency 
of communication between  those two nodes. 
Two possibilities for  Dmin naturally  spring  to 
mind. In  the case where  the highest 
frequency  value is reasonable, this value can 
be used to fix Dmin.  In  cases where this value 
f a l l s s h o r t o f e x p e c t e d l e v e l s o f 
communication, a  reasonable maximum 
value can  be set (e.g., 1  communication/
hour).
SUB-GROUP IDENTIFICATION
Girvan  and Newman proposed an  algorithm 
for  community  structure identification, which 
Newman  generalized for  use with weighted 
networks. 20  The method relies on  the use of 
edge betweenness,  which is the edge variant 
(instead of nodes)  of betweenness discussed 
earlier.  Edges with  high  betweenness values 
can be thought  of as bottlenecks to 
information  flow.  Girvan  and Newman  argue 
that  the reason  these edges are bottlenecks is 
that  these  edges are really  intercommunity 
edges – those few  edges that  connect 
otherwise-unconnected portions of the 
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network. Hence,  their  removal will  result in 
isolation of sub-groups.  
Successive identification  and removal of 
the highest  betweenness valued edges can  be 
mapped to a  dendrogram  (see Figure 5  for 
example),  from  which  hierarchical  patterns of 
community  structure can be seen. However, 
to address the question, “How  many 
communities should a network be split  into?” 
a  threshold criterion  must  be applied.  Thus, 
Newman  and Girvan  introduced the concept 
of modularity,  Q, which  they  define as the 
difference in  the fraction  of edges falling 
within  communities versus that if edges were 
assigned at  random. More formally,  Q  is 
calculated using the equation (Equation 3):21
    (3)
Where i and j are player indices, Aij is the 
weight  of the connection  between  players i 
and j,  m  is the number  of edges in  the 
network, and ki and kj are the degree values 
for  players i and j, respectively. Similarly,  ci 
and cj are the sub-groups to which  players i 
and j are assigned, and δ(ci,cj)  is defined as 1 
if ci = cj, and 0,  otherwise. Nonzero values 
indicate deviations from  randomness, with  a 
maximum  possible Q-value of 1.  Based on 
evaluations of a  variety  of case networks with 
known  sub-groups,  Newman  and Girvan 
found that modularity  values of ~0.3  or  more 
usually  indicate good divisions.  Upon 
generating the hierarchical dendrogram, the 
modularity  of each  level within  the 
dendrogram  is calculated,  and the sub-
grouping with  the highest  modularity  value is 
chosen.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CODING RESULTS AND CLASSIFICATION
A  total  of 3681  evaluator  entries associated 
with  the Portland,  Oregon  portion  of 
TOPOFF 4  were coded.  Since some entries 
c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n  o n m u l t i p l e 
communications or  meetings, 4241  entries 
were obtained after  coding. Of these, 2128 
(50 percent) contained information that 
could be cast  as a  “from-to”  communication; 
354  (8.3  percent) were duplicate entries 
resulting  from  more than  one evaluator 
recording the same event; 318  (7.5  percent) 
were entries in  which  one or  both  of the 
communicating parties were not identified; 
and 64  (1.5  percent)  were instances where 
evaluators noted a failure to achieve 
communication  (e.g.,  an  unanswered call). 
Remaining entries were unrelated to 
communication between players.
A  visual representation  of the resulting 
network is shown  in  Figure 3.  One hundred 
sixty-five distinct  players are represented as 
nodes; each  is assigned a numerical  label.  In 
the figure,  degree values are used to size node 
r a d i i . 22  T h e a d j a c e n c y  m a t r i x o f 
communication  between players is highly 
sparse – of the 13,530  possible edge 
combinations, only  741  (5.5  percent)  player 
pairs exhibit a  non-zero frequency  of 
communication. The distribution  of these 
frequencies of communication exhibits an 
exponential decay  (see Figure 4), with  the 
majority  (76  percent) of edges valued at  less 
than  0.2  instances of communication per 
h o u r .  T h e m a x i m u m  f r e q u e n c y  o f 
communication  observed was approximately 
three instances of communication per hour. 
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Figure 3.  Network representation of  the Portland,  Oregon site of  TOPOFF 4. Each numerically  labeled node 
represents a unique player participating in the exercise.  Node radii were scaled based on degree value. The degree 
of a node is simply a count of the number of other nodes with which it is directly connected.
Figure 4. Distribution of  the TOPOFF 4 (Portland, Oregon site) network edge values; edge values assigned based on 
the frequency of communication taking place between player pairs.
SAN SU, EXERCISE COORDINATION  8
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 17 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Since part  of the benefit  of an exercise 
such  as TOPOFF is to examine the 
effectiveness of interactions taking  place 
between  levels of government (e.g., local, 
c o u n t y , s t a t e , f e d e r a l ) ,  p l a y e r 
communications were also sorted into the 
categories shown in  Table 1.  As listed, 
communication  volumes were quite low  for 
private,  volunteer,  and media  players, 
perhaps reflecting  low  participation  and 
incomplete integration of these player  types 
into the exercise.23 Communication  between 
agencies operating at  the same level of 
government was the highest.  Meanwhile, 
communication with  players at  adjoining 
levels of government tended to be higher 
than  communication  across multiple levels of 
government.  This is expected from  a 
hierarchical  communication  structure in 
which  a  player  communicates predominantly 
with  players at the same level  or  immediately 
above or  below  them  in  the organizational 
hierarchy.
Table 1. TOPOFF 4 Portland, Oregon site: Matrix of communication across player types by percentage
Local County State Federal Private Volunteer Media
Local 9.9% 9.1% 4.4% 7.0% 0.7% 1.8% 1.0%
County 10.5% 5.5% 4.3% 1.1% 2.3% 2.3%
State 14.4% 9.4% 1.6% 1.3% 0.7%
Federal 9.8% 1.0% 0.1% 1.7%




Early  in  the aftermath  of an event,  the chaos 
that  results,  the desire to rapidly  attain 
situational  awareness, and the eagerness to 
bring resources to bear  create a  more frenetic 
pace to the response. This presumably  settles 
down as the response matures. Table 3  lists 
the daily  percentage of unsuccessful 
communications occurring  for  the exercise. 
Data  show  that  the higher  number  of 
unsuccessful  communications taking place on 
the first  two days is a  result  of the higher 
volume of communication  taking  place. No 
trends in behavior  across days were readily 
observed.  This may  be due to exercise 
artificiality  (e.g.,  information injects), 
transitions in  mission  command (from  life 
safety  to crime scene investigation  to site 
assessment), and/or  incorporation of smaller 
component exercises (e.g.,  a  Medical Care 
Point exercise)  within  TOPOFF 4.  In other 
words,  what  we are  really  seeing  is something 
akin to an exercise of exercises.
Table 2. Unsuccessful communications as represented 





% of Total 
Communication
s Failing
Day 1 22 2.6%
Day 2 31 3.8%
Day 3 3 1.1%
Day 4 8 3.5%
KPP-NEGATIVE FOR VALUED EDGES
Network fragmentation was observed to be 
very  high  in the base case,  with  an F-value 
equal to 0.972. This is due to the sparseness 
of the matrix  of communication  edges.  The 
top five  players based on percent change in  F 
are shown  in  Table 3. These are the players 
whose absence resulted in  the greatest 
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increase in  network  fragmentation. Of these, 
the top four  are response-coordinating 
e n t i t i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g e a c h  l e v e l o f 
government.  Results confirm  their  critical 
role  in facilitating  communication exchange. 
In  contrast,  while playing a  significant  role in 
initial  response activities,  dispatch  (ranked 17 
out of 165  players),  police (ranked 45)  and 
fire (ranked 54) had less significant  impacts 
on  overall  communication  fragmentation  in 
the exercise. Thus, relatively  speaking, 
players expected to be central to coordination 
functioned as such in this exercise.24 
Table 3.  Percent change in fragmentation value 
associated with the removal of  players from the network 
of  participants. Top five players for the TOPOFF 4 
Portland, Oregon site listed.
Player % Change in 
F





Joint Field Office (JFO) 0.15
Port Office 0.14
SUB-GROUP IDENTIFICATION
The resulting  dendrogram  of player 
relationships is shown  in  Figure 5.  To 
simplify  representation  of the dendrogram, 
going from  the top of the figure to the 
bottom, the state of community  sub-
groupings is shown  at  regular intervals of 
twenty-five edges removed from  the 
network. 25  The bottom  row  of the 
dendrogram  corresponds to all players 
participating in  the exercise.  Players 
connected at lower levels of the dendrogram 
indicate stronger  ties to one another. Figure 5 
is meant  to highlight  the rich  layering  of 
community  structure found within  the 
exercise,  as captured by  this technique. The 
various sub-groups identified are  discussed 
below.
Figure 5. Dendrogram showing the community  structure of  players involved in the TOPOFF 4 Portland, Oregon site. 
The bottom row lists all 165 players identified. Horizontal lines are indicative of  sub-group relations. The presence of 
horizontal lines closer to the bottom of  the dendrogram is indicative of  greater closeness among the players 
connected.
To determine the correct  number of sub-
groups, modularity  values were calculated at 
all  levels of the dendrogram.  Results are 
shown in  Figure 6.  A  maximum  modularity  of 
0.371  was obtained, which  exceeds the 
threshold of 0.3  that Girvan  and Newman 
indicated gave good divisions.26 At this value, 
the community  is composed of numerous 
individual player  nodes,  four  sub-groups of 
two players, and twelve sub-groups of three 
or  more players.  With  respect to the larger 
sub-groups of three or  more players,  two 
arise from  incomplete integration  of smaller, 
one-day  exercises within  the main  exercise. 
Three others sub-groups stem  from 
peripheral players that had limited, sector-
specific  participation (e.g., transportation, 
utility).  Overall, no cases were found in 
reviewing  each  sub-group’s player  list  in 
which  players appeared to be incorrectly 
placed (i.e., players with  which the sub-group 
had little/no communication).  Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, fire  and EMS response 
elements were both  more strongly  associated 
with  a medical care point exercise  taking 
place the second day  than  with  on-site 
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incident  response activities the first day. 
Based on  a  review  of the evaluator  logs, this 
may  be due to an  emphasis on recording 
operational  versus communication  activities 
at the incident site during the first day.
Figure 6.  Modularity  values versus the number of 
edges removed from the network. Modularity  values 
were calculated at intervals of  25 edges removed, with 
additional points analyzed near the maximum. The 
maximum modularity  obtained was 0.371. A total of  741 
edges exist in the original network. Edges were 
removed based on the method developed by  Girvan 
and Newman.27
The TOPOFF 4 After Action Report noted 
that  six key  decision-making  nodes were 
present  during the exercise and that  these 
nodes operated largely  independent  of one 
another.28 The six  nodes were: (1) the state 
ECC and state  public health  agency 
operations center  (AOC); (2) the JFO; (3) the 
local  EOCs/ECCs; (4) the incident  site unified 
command; (5)  the public health  unified 
command; and (6)  the Federal Radiological 
Moni tor ing  and Assessment  Center 
(FRMAC).  The breakdown  in  sub-groups 
deviated somewhat from this picture in that:
• The state ECC  and AOC were found to 
operate in separate sub-groups;
• The JFO was found to be within the same 
sub-group as the state ECC; and
• Players at  the incident  site unified 
command, the public  health  unified 
command,  the local EOCs/ECCs and 
FRMAC were found in the same sub-group.
There are several possible explanations for 
these discrepancies.  As mentioned earlier, 
since the conclusions of the TOPOFF 4  after-
action report  were largely  drawn from  post-
exercise interviews,  its breakdown  of sub-
groups may  be subject  to recollection  bias. 
For  example, interviewees may  have formed 
their  opinions based on  a  few  instances of 
failed communication rather  than  taking  into 
consideration  the larger  volume of successful 
communication  taking place throughout the 
exercise.29 Furthermore,  this technique does 
not consider  the quality  of communications 
taking  place (i.e.,  the importance of the 
i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n v e y e d i n  t h e 
communication), which  undoubtedly  factors 
into interviewees’ perceptions.  Finally, 
perceived failures in  information  sharing may 
in  fact  be due to “internal”  communication 
failures (e.g., from  incident commander  to 
command staff and liaisons).  This was noted 
in  some of the evaluator  descriptions,  but not 
captured in this analysis.  Regardless, this 
technique provides a robust  breakdown  of 
sub-groups and points out  interesting aspects 
to consider  for  player  integration  and 
exercise design.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper  describes two social  network 
analysis techniques that  provide quantitative 
proxies for  coordination  assessment. 
Borgatti’s KPP-Negative technique for 
quantifying  network  fragmentation  was 
selected to identify  whether  coordinating 
entities (e.g.,  EOCs) were playing  a 
significant role in  establishing effective 
communications and expanded to deal  with 
valued edges.  Meanwhile,  Girvan  and 
Newman’s technique for  community  sub-
group examination  was selected to identify 
possible instances of information  stove-
piping. These techniques were successfully 
implemented in  a  case study  analysis of 
TOPOFF 4. Both  techniques show  promise 
for  providing  additional  insights into 
coordination performance, identifying 
exercise artificialities,  and opening  the door 
to possible meta-analysis of coordination 
performance (e.g., over  time,  across regions, 
for different types and scales of events). 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite providing valuable insights into the 
implementation of social network  analysis on 
a  somewhat large scale, the examination  of 
TOPOFF 4  discussed in  this article remains a 
single test  case. Analysis of additional 
datasets,  both  for  comparison to real-world 
events as well as different  exercises,  is 
necessary  to understand the benefits and 
limitations of the proposed techniques.  As 
noted earlier, since evaluators were not 
collecting information  for  the specific 
purpose of constructing  a  communication 
network, the quality  of the TOPOFF 4  dataset 
was impaired. A simple list of lessons learned 
from  this coding  effort  is provided in 
Appendix A  in  the hopes of improving  data 
collection for future exercises. 
While  application of network  techniques 
to new  areas such  as homeland security 
appears straightforward,  these techniques 
must  be tuned to reflect  the reality  and 
uniqueness of what we are trying to model for 
results to be meaningful.  One area  for 
continued exploration  is the valuation of 
edges. In particular,  two aspects come to 
mind.
First,  in  the current  analysis, frequencies 
of communication  for  all players are 
implicitly  measured against one standard 
(i.e.,  1/Dmin). However, circumstances can 
easily  be envisioned where a  player  would 
require a  much  lower  – but  equally  effective 
– frequency  of communication  with  one 
player  versus another.  For  example,  some 
teams may  operate in  a  self-sufficient 
manner, requiring only  initial information  as 
to where to mobilize.  Thus, the current 
approach  to edge weighting will be evolved 
into something  more akin  to a  utility-based 
approach. Based on  player-pair  combination 
types,  ideal frequencies of communication 
will be pre-defined via subject  matter 
expertise. In  turn, these will be used to 
normalize the actual frequencies of 
communication observed. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, instances of 
failed communication  were treated as simply 
cancelling out instances of successful 
communication  on a  one-to-one basis.  This 
may  not  be a  sufficient  penalty  to associate 
with  such  failures. Re-evaluation  of the 
network given  different assumptions for 
failed communication  may  be performed to 
identify  the sensitivity  of the network  to such 
assumptions and to see whether  sub-
groupings occur  that  align  better  with  after-
action report findings. 
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APPENDIX A 
Enhancing Exercise Data Collection for Social Network Analysis 
As mentioned previously, the TOPOFF 4  dataset used in this analysis was not  collected with  the 
construction  of a  communication  network in  mind.  In  order  to enhance the value of the 
techniques discussed, improvements to the underlying data  are necessary. With  respect  to 
future exercises, the following are recommended:
1. “To” and “From” agencies should be clearly identified in each log entry.
2. All agencies situated at each physical location must be identified.
3. One of the artificialities of an  exercise is that agencies participate  for  different amounts 
of time. Entry and exit of participants need to be noted.
4. If information about an  agency  is not  obtained directly  from  that agency,  but  through  a 
third party, the third-party should be clearly identified.
5. Distribution lists for documents, reports, and updates should be identified.
6. Participating individuals should be mapped to their associated agencies.
7. Email and phone logs should be collected.
8. Prior  to the exercise, participating agencies should be queried as to their  ideal 
frequencies of communication with one another.
9. For  teleconferences, meetings,  and briefings,  a  record of all participating  agencies should 
be made.
10. The beginning and endpoints of meetings should be clearly indicated.
11. Evaluators should synchronize watches for log  time-stamps.  This will  facilitate removal 
of duplicate entries.
12. Clear  and consistent use of acronyms and agency  names should be enforced.  For 
instance,  during  TOPOFF 4  there was both  a  federal DOE response as well  as a  state 
DOE response.
13. Shorthand used during  recording  should be clarified with  an associated key  or converted 
back into long-form.
14. If summary  recordings are made (detailing the communications taking  place over  a  long 
period of time), new  communications should be  distinguished from  those previously 
posted in  prior  evaluator  logs.  If possible,  a  sense of the frequency  of communication 
during that period should be indicated.
15. Posts to tools such as WebEOC and their  use as a source of evaluator log entries should 
be clearly  indicated.  WebEOC  entries should also include a signature of the individual 
responsible for making the entry.
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